Cabo Ligado
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In the past four weeks, Cabo Delgado has been hit by the continued actions of Islamic State Mozambique (ISM), Cyclone Chido, a continuing food crisis, and the nationwide disorder that has followed October’s disputed election. Cyclone Chido landed on 15 December, damaging the lives and livelihoods of almost half a million people. ISM’s activity has declined since November as the group concentrates on ensuring basic supplies. There have been just 10 fatalities in ISM-related events since our last update, compared to the 57 fatalities in the four weeks preceding that. This compares to 54 fatalities throughout Mozambique from demonstrations from 9 December to 12 January, most of them related to the fallout from October’s still-disputed election. In this update, we look at the decrease in ISM activity, which is still centered in the north of Cabo Delgado province. We analyze the widespread and diverse forms of disorder erupting in the south of the province, much of it election-related. We also review the ongoing and countrywide election-related disorder and the difficulties political elites will face as they attempt to control it.
Situation Summary
ISM looting displaces thousands
ISM activity in the reporting period has been limited. This may partly be explained by Cyclone Chido, which cut through the province’s southern districts after hitting land on 15 December. According to a source who claims knowledge of an ISM meeting near Quiterajo on 7 January, the group itself was not as active as it had planned to be. According to the source, a number of operations that had been planned for settlements along the N380 had not taken place. The source claimed that priorities for the next six months were to secure supplies through looting, establish bases close to the N380, and continue with a combination of attacks on civilians and military positions. This does not represent a novel strategy but, if correct, indicates that the N380 highway will remain insecure in coming months.
ISM’s most significant actions in December were in Muidumbe district. On 11 December, ISM fighters entered Miangelewa and reportedly killed two civilians. Most residents fled on their approach, allowing ISM to concentrate on looting supplies. According to local sources, the group commandeered a tractor and trailer to transport foodstuff and other goods. The operation continued the following day despite, according to one source, the arrival of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) on the evening of 11 December. The town was attacked again on 18 December. There were no fatalities and, again, ISM looted supplies. One week later, on 25 December, the village of Litapata, 13 kilometers west of Miangelewa, was also attacked. Local sources mentioned only the looting of supplies, though a photo report from Islamic State showed three fatalities. In the face of the attacks, almost 7,000 people have fled from the area, according to the International Organization for Migration, adding to the humanitarian crisis caused by cyclone Chido.
Miangelewa has been attacked four times since July 2024, despite being within 10 km of two military outposts. The RDF has an outpost less than 10 km south in Macomia district, while the Defense Armed Forces of Mozambique’s (FADM) nearest position is at Xitaxi, less than 9 km northwest. These outposts were established to secure the N380 highway and can potentially serve as bases from which to operate against insurgents in the Messalo river basin. However, repeated attacks against Miangelewa, which sits on the N380, suggest that state forces have adopted a more responsive posture.
In Nangade district on 11 December, a joint force of FADM, police, the Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF), and the Local Force, a local state militia, ambushed a small group of ISM fighters, killing one, and injuring a civilian in the area. The ambush took place at Ng’angolo village, approximately 24 km south of Nangade district headquarters. An unknown number escaped and modest supplies were retrieved. In a leaked internal report, the police described the victim as “Guilherme, right-hand man of the terrorist Óscar who was heading the group.” Neither name has appeared in public or privileged analyses of ISM leadership that have been reviewed by Cabo Ligado. This is the fifth event involving the TPDF recorded in 2024, compared to just two in the previous three years.
In Macomia district, FADM, police, and the RDF are now maintaining a presence in the coastal areas around Mucojo and Quiterajo, previously controlled by ISM, according to sources in the area. Cabo Ligado understands that there is a checkpoint at Manica village checking the papers of civilians going to and from the coast from Macomia district headquarters. According to local sources, on 7 January, four men and one woman were abducted by members of FADM when on their way to Mucojo, with the motive understood to be financial. Increased state security presence has not wholly deterred ISM. Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for a 4 January attack on a FADM outpost in Quiterajo and for the death of one soldier. Nevertheless, this was the first clash on the Macomia coast since mid-November, suggesting state forces are having some success.
Disorder breaks out in southern Cabo Delgado
Cabo Delgado and neighboring Nampula province saw significant post-election violence, and related disorder, particularly after 23 December, when the Constitutional Council confirmed the disputed electoral victory of Frelimo’s Daniel Chapo over Podemos’ Venâncio Mondlane. In Montepuez district, post-election disorder is compounded by the competing claims of mining interest groups, contributing to volatility. In Montepuez town, around 21 December, dismissed Montepuez Ruby Mine (MRM) workers blocked the N1 highway leading to Pemba. On 23 December, in Namanhumbir in Montepuez district, people damaged the police station and other community facilities, according to the company that controls MRM, which operates near the town. The company, Gemfields, also reported damage to its camp’s water supply system and to a police post in a nearby resettlement village it had constructed. The following day, over 200 people, who the company claimed were connected to illegal ruby miners, attempted to enter the company’s residential camp in the town. According to Gemfields, two of the crowd were shot dead, presumably by security forces.
Also on 23 December, Venâncio Mondlane supporters demonstrated in Montepuez town after the Constitutional Council announced the final election results. Social media posts showed demonstrators blocking a road, and what was claimed to be two people shot dead by the police Rapid Intervention Force.
As well as demonstrations against the results, there have also been targeted killings of opposition leaders. In Montepuez town, on 3 January, Abdul Lawia, a district official for the Podemos party, was assassinated at his home. According to an eyewitness, the killers wore the uniform of the Local Force. On 6 January in Ancuabe district, another Podemos official, Rachide Eduardo, was assassinated at his home in Ntutupue. The following day over 50 buildings in the town related to the local administration were set alight during a violent demonstration in which at least one person, a Frelimo member, died. Another Podemos activist, Arlindo Chissale, the Pemba town-based founder of Pinnacle News, has not been seen since around 7 January.
At least one aid delivery has been intercepted and stolen. According to the World Food Programme, on 29 December, an unidentified group looted an aid truck at Ntocota in Metuge district. As a result, WFP suspended aid deliveries in the area for one week.
Focus: Mondlane’s Turbo V8 drives disorder
Unrest increased precipitously in 2024, with almost 400 demonstrations recorded compared to just 89 in the previous year. ACLED data indicate that Venâncio Mondlane has driven these protests against the Frelimo government since October 2023. In that month’s municipal elections, Mondlane ran for mayor of Maputo and mobilized supporters to contest the results when Frelimo was declared the winner. Those demonstrations in Maputo made up a quarter of the nationwide spike in demonstrations that month. In June 2024 he left Renamo, having been prevented from competing to be the party’s presidential candidate. Mondlane then sought the backing of the Democratic Alliance Coalition (CAD). When the National Elections Commission blocked his candidacy in July, he called for nationwide protests led by CAD, causing another rise in demonstrations.
The unprecedented level of demonstrations in Mozambique in the final quarter of 2024 was again driven by Mondlane, who contested the presidency with the backing of the small Podemos party. Over 80% of demonstrations took place in the final quarter, and around 75% of those involved Podemos supporters, often in response to calls to protest by Mondlane from exile, by way of his regular livestreams on Facebook.
On 16 December Mondlane used his Facebook platform to present the schedule of what he dubbed the ‘Turbo V8’ phase of demonstrations, calling for peaceful demonstrations on 23 December, when the Constitutional Council was set to announce the election results. As with his previous calls to demonstrate, supporters countrywide responded enthusiastically. The 30 demonstrations on 23 December surpass levels previously recorded by ACLED for any one day in Mozambique. From 23 December to 9 January, ACLED records 41 fatalities in 61 demonstrations in eight provinces. Over one-third of demonstrations occurred in Zambezia province where, as elsewhere, protesters targeted Frelimo and government institutions. Zambezia has historically been a Renamo stronghold. The intensity of actions by supporters of Podemos and Venâncio Mondlane in Zambezia, almost 50% of which have been violent, may be an expression of Renamo’s decline, as well as of dissatisfaction with Frelimo.
However, Mondlane does not direct or control all of the unrest. In Nampula and Zambezia, groups of youth embracing the Naparama identity have clashed with state forces. Not operating under any central leadership, Naparama are locally organized groups of youth that have appropriated the name and behaviors of the Naparama militia that emerged in Zambezia during the civil war and re-emerged in 2022 in response to ISM. In Nampula province on 25 December, Naparama attacked Namapa, the Eráti district headquarters. They reportedly killed five at the district police headquarters, likely police officers, before freeing prisoners held there. The attack is thought to be related to the disputed election results. The district administration offices, the office of the National Elections Commission, and a bank were damaged either by the Naparama or other youth in the town, according to clips on social media. In Ile district headquarters in Zambezia, Naparama exchanged gunfire with police on 20 December. On the same day in Luabo town, also in Zambezia, Naparama clashed with police, but no fatalities were reported. In Nampula city, on 8 and 9 January, three organized land invasions took place by self-identified Podemos sympathizers, targeting privately owned land, including a large tract owned by the Catholic Church. These are not isolated incidents, but are outside of Mondlane’s call for supporters to mobilize. In Inhambane province, where Chapo was governor, tourist resorts were overrun in Vilanculos on 11 January.
State repression — including the targeting of Podemos officials in Cabo Delgado — is also fueling violence and unrest. The state is also accused of orchestrating the escape of over 1,500 prisoners from Maputo provincial prison in Matola on 25 December. Contradictory explanations from the authorities and unconfirmed reports of killings of prisoners led the Mozambique Bar Association to accuse the authorities of deliberately releasing them.
The Constitutional Council-affirmed election results mean that Renamo has been displaced by Podemos as the main party of opposition, while Podemos is in dispute with Mondlane over the party’s decision to take its seats in parliament. Given Mondlane’s leadership role in opposition over the past year, Podemos’ role as a significant party of opposition is thus far from secure. Mondlane’s future role also remains unclear since his return to the country on 9 January. The pattern of events, such as the changing role of the Naparama, suggests that elite settlements at the national level alone may not entirely stem disorder as President Chapo establishes his administration.
How Chapo manages negotiations with the political opposition will have significant bearing on levels of unrest in 2025, and Mondlane’s political future. Given Renamo’s failure in these elections, it may lead to constitutional revisions to a greater or lesser degree, as many state structures draw their constitutional basis from the civil war settlement. Mondlane’s ability to direct popular discontent with Frelimo has been evident in recent months. However, he has not been able to maintain a united front with the leadership of Podemos, disagreeing most notably on the party leadership’s decision to take its seats in parliament. Having returned to the country on 9 January, his skills in close-quarters political negotiations with both a new administration and his opposition colleagues will be tested. On President Chapo’s side, the level of popular discontent and its potential consequences for Frelimo may prompt some concessions, potentially based on Mondlane’s key issues of housing and jobs.
Round Up
SADC calls for an end to hostilities in the wake of post-election violence in Mozambique
On 31 December, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) issued its first statement on the post-electoral violence in Mozambique following the 9 October elections. The statement noted that the series of protests that followed the Constitutional Court’s announcement of the results on 23 December had led to loss of life and heightened tensions. The regional bloc said it was concerned about the economic problems the situation had caused and urged all political actors in Mozambique to show restraint, cease hostilities, and promote peaceful dialogue for stability and development.
Mozambique LNG says no evidence of abuse allegations
The Mozambique LNG consortium released a statement in late November saying it had found no evidence of the human rights abuses reported by journalist Alex Perry in Politico in September, which he alleged occurred near the Afungi LNG site between July and November 2021. The investigation by the TotalEnergies-led consortium involved reviewing internal communications, logs of over 1,200 calls with local communities, and community survey reports commissioned by the project in 2022 and 2023.
