REPORT OF THE DOUBLE TROIKA PLUS ANGOLA TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT MISSION TO THE REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN CABO DELGADO AND REQUIRED REGIONAL SUPPORT

1.0 BACKGROUND

1.1 Following the security threat posed by acts of terrorism and violent extremism in the Province of Cabo Delgado in the Republic of Mozambique, the Extraordinary Double Troika Summit (EO-DTS) held in Maputo, Republic of Mozambique on the 8 April 2021, directed that a Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) be deployed to Mozambique to undertake an assessment of the security situation. The SADC Double Troika Plus Angola in her capacity as Chairperson of the Defence Intelligence Standing Committee (DISC) supported by the SADC Secretariat deployed in Mozambique from 15-21 April 2021. The Terms of Reference of the Mission are attached as Annex A.

1.2 The purpose of the mission was to undertake a Technical Assessment in order to:

a. develop an understanding on the type of threat which Mozambique is facing so as to determine an immediate regional response;

b. to identify immediate support for Mozambique with capabilities to enhance surveillance for maritime, air and ground security.

c. propose a regional coordination mechanism to facilitate the implementation of the support to be provided by the Region; and,

d. present a report to an Extraordinary Meeting of the Ministerial Committee of the Organ by 28 April 2021 to be considered by an Extraordinary Organ Troika Summit, to be held in the Republic of Mozambique on 29 April 2021.

1.3 Pursuant to the EO-DTS decision the Technical Assessment Mission was constituted by representatives from the Republics of Angola, Botswana, South Africa, Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. The participants were selected from various specialities and expertise, including intelligence, operations from air, maritime, and ground domains, communications and logistics. The reconnaissance mission was conducted under the leadership of the representative of the Chairperson of the Organ Troika, the Republic of Botswana. The attendance list attached as Annex B.
1.4 The assessment was held at the Clube Militar in Maputo, Republic of Mozambique on 15 April 2021 for initial planning session, in which it received and considered the Security Situation Brief from the Republic of Mozambique.

1.5 The Team also conducted a physical reconnaissance of Province of Cabo Delgado on the 17 April 2021 where it was met and briefed on the intelligence and operational aspect by FADM Commanders on the ground. The reconnaissance plan is attached as Annex C.

2.0 SECURITY SITUATION

2.1 The security situation in the Province of Cabo Delgado in the Republic of Mozambique continues to be relatively calm but unpredictable due to threat posed by terrorist activities. The terrorist group is known locally as Al Shabaab (no known links to Al Shabaab in Somalia), and also known as Al Sunnah or Al Sunnah wa Jama’ah (ASWJ) which perpetrate acts of terrorism and violent extremism in some areas of the province. The community continue to live in a state of fear as they do not know when and where the next attacks will take place.

2.2 Reports indicate that since 2017 the group has killed at least 790 civilians after carrying out at least 510 attacks. In total, at least 2,250 people have been killed, including terrorists, security forces and civilians. Presently some affected areas are completely deserted and the population in those areas has been displaced leading to the gross deterioration of the situation calling for humanitarian relief/assistance. Insecurity in the province has seen the number of Internally Displaced Person (IDPs) rise to over 800,000.

2.3 Recently the town of Palma with a population of approximately 75,000 people excluding IDPs was attacked by terrorists. The attack which began on the 24 March 2021 is estimated to have been launched by at least 120 terrorists who split into several groups in possession of what looked like new weapons. The Terrorists launched coordinated attacks on Palma from at least three different directions namely the Manguna-Pundanhar intersection, via Nhica do Rovuma and the Palma Airfield. It is believed that several terrorists infiltrated Palma dressed in police and FADM military uniform and were accommodated in sympathizers’ houses. The terrorists are said to have entered Palma using false credentials. FADM has regained full control of Palma after pushing back the enemy from the town. Thus the situation in Palma is under control of the Defence and Security Forces of Mozambique which has a Company based in Palma to contain the situation, with an element of Special Forces supported by helicopters in pursuit of the terrorists. The terrorists are now said to be operating in small groups in the outskirts of Palma District. Despite this, on the 16 April 2021, the terrorists killed a woman in a deserted village in Muidumbe District called Nagunde.

2.4 It is noted that several Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are currently offering humanitarian assistance in the affected areas. These are World

2.5 Mocimboa da Praia town including the airport/airstrip and the harbour/port areas has been under the control of terrorist since August 2020. The town is considered to be one of the strong bases for the terrorists. The terrorists also occupy and operate from Siria (1 & 2) and Mbau. In the course of launching such attacks the terrorists looted hotels and attacked shopping centres, banks and the barracks of the FADM and Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR). Sources report that the Standard Bank, BCI, BIM were destroyed along with a Total fuel station. The Business Park, Afrimat, and Amarula Hotel, and government buildings as well as private businesses were also targeted. The Terrorists first attacked the police station along the coast in Palma, and then moved inward and attacked the business park, where they reportedly robbed the BIM and Standard banks; telecommunication infrastructure was also destroyed in the process of the attack.

2.6 The current situation on the ground is characterized by terrorist movements between Mocimboa De Praia (MDP) and Muidembe district. The areas which terrorists are active include Milamba and Zalala localities in Mocimboa De Praia as well as Shinda, Tchinga and Muatide in Muidembe. In the course of their movements terrorists establish positions and use them to launch fresh attacks on the localities.

2.7 Despite the presence of terrorists and perpetrated incidents of insecurity FADM has seized control of the majority of Cabo Delgado and maintains presence in strategic areas and areas of both operational and tactical value/importance including Pemba, Mueda, Palma, Afunji Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) construction sites owned and operated by TOTAL Oil Company as well as Ibo Island and surrounding Islands that forms part of the archipelago. Currently, the Afunji Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project is deserted due to the fact that all staff were evacuated for security reasons and the area including the airport is currently under the FADM control who are using it for resupplies.

2.8 The terrorists are alleged to be financed through money transfer from sympathisers through electronic means of payment such as M-Pesa, M-kesh e E-mola and others. Funders are said to be mainly individuals and private organisations from South Africa, Tanzania, DRC, Uganda, Burundi and other parts of the world. They also get funding from income from organized crime syndicates exploiting natural resources such as timber, precious stones, poaching and drug trafficking.

2.9 There is currently no information with regards to where the terrorists get their arms from, but during the last attack new weapons were used. Some weapons are captured from the dead FADM soldiers but not in big numbers. The Terrorists are currently using machetes, AK47, PKM, RPG7, 60 and 80mm mortars. There are no indications of terrorists possess Surface to Air
Missiles. As means of communication the terrorists make use of satellite phones and cellular phones, Movitel being the most preferred network

**Intelligence Analysis**

2.10 The attacks target both local and foreign owned businesses. The recent attacks occurred shortly before the holy month of Ramadan and since then there has been a considerable lull in activities. The possibilities of renewed attacks are high after Ramadan however, this does not rule out the likelihood of attacks during the fasting period.

2.11 There are indications that terrorists receive external support from individuals in various countries. It is however not conclusive that they only get support from the above mentioned countries. The main suppliers of the terrorists are unconfirmed, but it is suspected that they are supplied by the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP). It is assessed that the terrorists selected Cabo Delgado as a main Headquarters because it is strategically located since it has easy access to the sea and FADM does not have adequate naval assets to patrol the maritime domain in the AOO, porous borders, and commonality in Kiswahili language, Islamic religion and easy movement of foreign fighters into the region and beyond as well affording them easy access for resupplies. The detailed intelligence report is attached as Annex D.

2.12 **TERRORISTS CENTRES OF GRAVITY (COG)**

**Strategic COG:** External Support.

**Operation COG:** Freedom of movement through maritime, land borders and airspace in the Area of Operation.

**Tactical COG:** Local terrorist leadership. Identifying and arresting of local leadership.

**Critical Capabilities:** Instilling fear and propaganda amongst the local population (use of social media and other platforms).

**Critical Requirements:** sustainment (funding, looting, food, clothing, weapons, recruitment, support base) and maritime freedom of movement.

**Critical vulnerabilities:** Poor logistical setup., vulnerable from air.

**Strengths:** Intelligence, local knowledge of terrain, culture, traditions, beliefs, religion, sympathy from the local population. Ability to intercept friendly forces (radio and GSM) communication. Use of satellite phones.

2.13 **TERRORISTS COURSES OF ACTION**

**Strategic:** Requirement of strategic and operational intelligence to identify and stop external support in all domains (Land, Air, Maritime and Cyber). Once these are identified, conduct terror activities in the identified countries that are seen to be supporting Mozambique.
Operational: Aggressive and continuous radicalization, recruitment, causing fear and panic within the local population in order to expand the caliphate in Cabo Delgado and to the SADC Region.

Tactical: Gather intelligence to profile all local leadership in order to conduct targeted terror operations.

2.14 INTELLIGENCE RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

a. A phased approach be adopted as follows:

   (1) Phase 1. Intelligence assets (Land, Air and Maritime) and personnel be deployed in support of FADM intelligence in order to gain an in-depth understanding of the enemy.

   (2) Phase 2. Immediate deployment of Special Forces and naval assets to conduct targeted operations and eliminate maritime crime in the Area of Operation respectively.


b. Humanitarian assistance be rendered to IDPs as a matter of priority.

c. Intelligence Training support be rendered to FADM.

3.0 CONDUCT OF THE TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT AND FINDINGS ON SUPPORT TO STRENGTHEN THE FADM CAPABILITIES (AIR, MARITIME AND GROUND)

3.1 Following the findings obtained through Technical Assessment Team observation and the intelligence shared by the FADM through security situation and intelligence briefs, the Technical Assessment Team has identified courses of actions for the SADC region in support of the Republic of Mozambique and areas of support to strengthen FADM capability to combat terrorist activities in the province of Cabo Delgado and prevent further spill over to the rest of the country and region at large.

3.2 The Technical Assessment Team observed that FADM requires immediate support in the fields of Air, Maritime and ground operational capabilities. In provision of such support to the FADM and Republic of Mozambique efforts to combat terrorism, the team considered three broad courses of action as follows:

   3.2.1 Course of Action 1: Deployment of SADC Forces (Deploy in Three Domains Air, Maritime and Ground) in which SADC will deploy forces to support FADM to neutralise the terrorists in the Area of Operation.
3.2.2 **Course of Action 2**: Training and Military Support in which SADC will provide training and logistical support to FADM. The matrix illustrating logistical support required is contained in Annex E.

3.2.3 **Course of Action 3**: Combination of COA 1 and COA 2: Deployment of forces and providing logistical support and training.

3.2.4 Having considered the three courses of action the assessment team recommends to the SADC Region to adopt Course of Action 3 which is the combination of deploying minimal forces that will provide critical assets for the mission whilst also providing logistical support and training to Mozambique.

3.2.5 Capabilities and assets proposed to strengthen FADM capability are attached in Annex E.

3.2.6 The mission in support of Mozambique will be deployed to achieve the following objectives:

a. To neutralize the terrorism threat in order to create a secure environment.

b. To support Mozambique to restore law and order in affected areas of Cabo Delgado Province.

c. To provide air support to strengthen FADM air capability in combating terrorist threat.

d. To provide maritime support to Mozambique in order to enforce maritime law and deny terrorist freedom of action along Mozambique territorial waters and inland waters within Cabo Delgado.

e. To support FADM to regain lost ground and create a secure environment in Cabo Delgado Province.

3.2.7 In order to realise the mission objectives and desired end state the following assets will be committed:

**Proposed Resources for SADC Support to Mozambique**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser</th>
<th>Asset</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Composition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Surface Patrol Ships</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>180x2</td>
<td>-Organic heli x 1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Organic Boarding Boats x 2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Organic Drones – 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(if possible)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Maritime Surveillance Aircraft</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>UAVs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Helicopters</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Transport Aircraft</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Air Command and Control personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Air Technicians</td>
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<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Air Communication Officers</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Metrological Officers</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Air Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ground Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Light Infantry Brigade Headquarters</td>
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<td>90</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Light Infantry Battalions</td>
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<td>620x3</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Special Forces Squadron</td>
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<td>15.</td>
<td>Engineer Squadron</td>
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<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Signal Squadron</td>
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<td>Logistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Logistics Company</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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**4.0 LOGISTIC SUPPORT**

4.1 The logistics support concept is initially based on air and sea systems of support after which land surface based support will be incorporated once the security situation in the area of operation becomes under control. The logistics requirements will be deployed in Mozambique from Nacala which is the Port of Entry (PoE) after which resources will be distributed to relevant operating bases through Pemba as an integrated Logistics Base. From Pemba, the requirements will be further distributed to Forward Logistical Areas (FLAs) of Mueda, Ibo, Palma and subsequently Mocimboa da Praia once the area is cleared of terrorists.
4.2 The Area of Operation (A00) has adequate existing facilities to support short to medium term operations under sub-conventional setting. The existing Airports and Seaports within Cabo Delgado Province can enable landing and take-off of up to heavy operational and transport aircraft whilst the seaports can accommodate extensive logistics support for conduct of the operation. The water and electricity facilities available have adequate capacity to logistically sustain the land, air and sea based operations. Business capacity of Pemba, Mueda and Palma was found able to facilitate local contracting for provision of perishables and other logistics requirements to maintain forces envisaged to be deployed.

4.3 On deployment, a minimum period of up to 30 days is recommended for self-sustainment after which replenishment of the logistical chain will commence. Further on, the SADC Forces Headquarters will then determine the replenishment cycle and system for each individual member state’s forces. The detailed Logistics Plan is attached as Annex F.

4.4 SADC SUPPORT TO FADM

4.4.1 The Host Nation (Mozambique) submitted its logistics requirements in order to capacitate their forces to be able to counter-terrorist activities. The list of requirements is annexed to this document as Annex G.

5.0 PROPOSED BUDGET FOR REGIONAL SUPPORT TO MOZAMBIQUE

5.1 Any foreseen deployment in support of FADM will require budget and resource support. The indicative budget to execute the recommended Course of Action will be attached as Annex H. Funding of the Regional support will sourced from the SADC Contingency Fund, Member States funds and also mobilized continental and international partners and stakeholders.

6.0 REGIONAL COORDINATION MECHANISM

6.1 In order to coordinate regional efforts for effective implementation of the possible mission mandate in Mozambique, SADC requires to establish coordination mechanism which will among other functions facilitate rear link communication among Member States and SADC Secretariat. The mechanism will also facilitate continuous liaison and coordination with Member State, the Host Nation and SADC Secretariat. The coordination mechanism will further facilitate mobilization and coordination of resources from Member States and SADC stakeholders.

6.2 Additionally, the centre will facilitate coordination among the SADC Mission, the Host Nation and United Nations Office for Counter-terrorism (UNOCT) in the implementation of the assistance package to Mozambique under the “2021-2023 Comprehensive whole-of-UN Assistance package to support Mozambique. Furthermore, the mechanism/centre will be responsible to coordinate efforts and support of Member States and other stakeholders including but not limited to humanitarian support. The JIFC will be able to enhance the Host nation and SADC Early warning mechanism with actionable intelligence.
The component of the Coordination Mechanism will include among others Civil-Military Coordination Centre (CMOC) and Joint Intelligence Fusion Centre (JIFC).

The write-up to establish Regional Coordination Mechanism in Maputo, Republic of Mozambique is attached as Annex I.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The SADC Technical Assessment Mission in Mozambique recommends the following to the Defence and Security Cluster:

a. SADC adopt recommended course of action three (3) which involves deployment of forces and provision of Military support and training. In that regard, the Assessment team proposes immediate deployment of SADC Standby Force under Scenario 6 in support of FADM to combat threat of terrorism and acts of violent extremism in Cabo Delgado.

b. Immediate deployment of:

(i) Intelligence assets (Land, Air and Maritime) and personnel be deployed in support of FADM intelligence in order to gain an in-depth understanding of the terrorists’ activities.

(ii) SADC Rapid Deployment comprised of Special Forces and naval assets to conduct targeted operations and eliminate maritime crime in the Area of Operation respectively.

c. SADC should establish a coordination mechanism in Maputo prior to the deployment of SADC Standby Force.

d. SADC should provide humanitarian relief to the population affected by the terrorist activities including the internally displaced persons

e. SADC should provide support (logistics and training) to strengthen FADM capability to combat terrorism.

Brigadier MM Mukokomani
Republic of Botswana
Chairperson
21 April 2021
LIST OF ANNEXES

A: Terms of Reference for the Technical Assessment Mission
B: Attendance List
C: Reconnaissance Plan
D: Intelligence Report
E: Operational Concept
F: Logistics Concept of Support
G: List of Mozambique Requirements for Support
H: SADC Indicative Budget in support of Mozambique
I: Regional Coordination Mechanism
J: Draft Mandate Document for the Mission
K: Draft Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
L: Draft Rules of Engagement (RoEs)
M: Roster Model for SADC Standby Force
N: Mozambique Brief